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Abstract1
This essay develops and defends a diagnosis of (Carroll in Mind 4(14):278–80, 1895)’s2
regress of the premises according to which the moral of the regress is that arguments3
are constitutively presuppositional. It is argued that this diagnosis allows to vindicate4
the key insights of the rule-following account of the regress, while overcoming the5
main difficulties that the rule-following account faces.6
Keywords Arguments · Presupposition · Regress7
1 Introduction8
Carroll (1895)’s famous regress of the premises arises in the course of an argument9
between Achilles and Tortoise that has the following structure. Suppose p and if p then10
q. From that, Achilles would really want to conclude that q. Tortoise would not allow11
it: q can be concluded—she objects—only if it is true that if p and if p then q then q.12
Hence, Achilles is led to suppose, in addition, that it is true that if p and if p then q13
then q. From that together with the earlier premises, Achilles would want to conclude14
that q. Tortoise would not allow it: it can be concluded that q—she objects—only if it15
is true that if p and if p then q then q. No provision of further premises will convince16
Tortoise to accept the conclusion. An infinite regress ensues.17
I am grateful to Harold Hodes, Arc Kocurek, and Tim Williamson for helpful discussion about these
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In the light of this regress, we are led to conclude that giving (or making) an18
argument by modus ponens is impossible. But giving (or making) an argument by19
modus ponens is, of course, possible.1 Hence, the paradox:20
Paradox How it is possible to give (or make) an argument by a logical rule (such as21
modus ponens)?22
Different precisifications of Paradox can be distinguished depending on how the23
force of the modal “it is possible . . .” is understood. One precisification is epistemic.24
The Epistemic Paradox arises when one asks what justifies one in reaching the25
conclusion of an argument by a logical rule:26
Epistemic Paradox How is justification of basic forms of arguments (such as an27
argument by modus ponens) possible?28
In this essay, I will have little to add to the standard discussions of the Epistemic29
Paradox (e.g., Dummett 1973; Stroud 1979; Fumerton 1995; Boghossian 2000; Philie30
2007; Besson 2012, 2018). I concur with those who think that the resulting regress31
can and should be stopped by allowing that one might be non-inferentially justified32
in believing that certain patterns of entailment hold (cf. Audi 1986; Williamson 1997;33
Dogramaci 2010). A solution to the Epistemic Paradox such as this might say nothing34
about the Structural Paradox, for it might say nothing about how it is possible to35
give an argument by modus ponens in a conceptual (or even metaphysical) sense:36
Structural Paradox How is it conceptually (or metaphysically) possible to give an37
argument by a logical rule?38
The Structural Paradox, as I will understand it, differs from a version of the39
paradox that arises from understanding the modality in terms of cognitive possibility:40
Cognitive Paradox How is it cognitively possible to give (or make) an argument by41
a logical rule?42
Although the Structural Paradox and the Cognitive Paradox have the same sub-43
ject matter—they both concern the act of giving (or making) an argument—the sense44
of ‘possible’ that is relevant for the Structural Paradox is not cognitive: instead,45
it is akin to the sense that is relevant, e.g., when philosophers ask whether coordi-46
nation and communication among agents would be possible in absence of common47
knowledge (e.g., Lewis 1969; Stalnaker 2002). Just like standard discussions of this48
question abstract from psychological and cognitive assumptions of rational agents, so49
the Structural Paradox abstracts from the psychological and cognitive assumptions50
1 A point about the terminology used throughout this essay. I will use ‘argument by modus ponens’ (or,
more generally, ‘argument by a logical rule’) to indicate an argument that exemplifies the rule of modus
ponens (see Sect. 2.2 for a more detailed explanation). So the speech act of giving (or making) an argument
by a logical rule (e.g., by modus ponens) is the speech act of giving (or making) an argument that exemplifies
that rule (e.g., the rule of modus ponens). I will often abbreviate ‘giving (or making) an argument’ with
‘arguing’ and ‘giving (or making) an argument by a rule (e.g., by modus ponens)’ with ‘arguing by a rule
(e.g., by modus ponens)’. I take it that in its core use, ‘argument’ refers to a linguistic entity that is the
object of the speech act of giving (or making) an argument (cf. Parsons 1996; Walton 1990; Hamblin 1970,
Chapter 7)). However, occasionally, I will use ‘argument’ to refer to the speech act of giving (or making)
an argument rather than about its object.
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about rational argument-givers: it asks about the possibility of arguments for sub-51
jects that are, like us, capable of arguments but do not necessarily share our cognitive52
make-up.53
One rationale for focusing on the Structural Paradox, over the Cognitive Para-54
dox, is that Carroll (1895)’s original regress arises without making substantive55
psychological assumptions about argument-givers. Hence, the interpretation of the56
modality in Paradox that is most faithful to Carroll’s original version of the regress is57
unlikely to be cognitive possibility. Further, the Structural Paradox is more general58
than the Cognitive Paradox. In virtue of this generality, as we will see, a response to59
the Structural Paradox might cast some light on the Cognitive Paradox too.60
Now, one prominent response to the Structural Paradox contends that giving (or61
making) an argument by modus ponens is possible by following the rule of modus62
ponens. Although the rule-following account is by far the most standard diagnosis,63
recently it has fallen on hard times. People have raised concerns about how exactly64
following a rule is to be understood for this account to provide a positive diagnosis of65
the paradox (cf. Boghossian 2014; Valaris 2017).66
And yet undeniably the rule-following account retains many attractions. This essay67
aims at developing and motivating a response to the Structural Paradox that over-68
comes the main challenges facing the rule-following account, while at the same time69
vindicating its key insights. According to the proposal developed here, following a70
rule in the course of an argument is a matter of presupposing that the rule is valid. The71
lesson of Carroll (1895)’s regress is that arguments are constitutively presuppositional.72
The methodological starting point of my discussion is that the Structural Paradox73
arises from the consideration that, despite the possibility of the regress, we do seem to74
be able to produce arguments by modus ponens. Thus, in order to find out how giving75
(or making) an argument by modus ponens is possible, it is natural to look at how we do76
in fact give (or make) arguments by modus ponens—the idea being that studying how77
we in fact give (or make) an argument by modus ponens might cast light on how it is78
possible to do so. Because Carroll (1895)’s Structural Paradox arises in the context79
of an argument given by Achilles—and because giving (or making) an argument is a80
speech act—the focus in this paper is the regress that arises for speech acts such as81
giving (or making) an argument and inferring. Although there are differences between82
the speech act of giving (or making) an argument and the speech act of making an83
inference, here I will focus on what these speech acts have in common. I will not84
be assuming that these speech acts cannot also be made privately in one’s mind, as85
when one thinks in words. However, this essay will not explicitly discuss a version86
of Carroll (1895)’s paradox that arises in the context of the reasoning (cf. Boghossian87
2014; Wright 2014; Broome 2013, 2014) on further substantive assumptions about88
reasoning is—in particular, if one endorses the so-called taking condition on reasoning89
(Longino 1978; Boghossian 2014). Although the response that I will defend to the90
Structural Paradox can be extended to this version of the regress too, I have to leave91
a detailed defense of this claim to another occasion.292
2 Pavese (2020) extends the response developed in this essay to the case of reasoning.
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In Sect. 2, I start by discussing a widely endorsed—but not fully developed—diagnosis94
of the paradox, which I will call the ‘common diagnosis’. According to it, the root of95
the regress is the distinctive structure of arguments. The common diagnosis is often96
assimilated to the rule-following account. I discuss some outstanding problems facing97
the rule-following account and I motivate developing a response to the Structural98
Paradox by elaborating a theory of the speech act of giving an argument.99
How does one study a speech act? Speech acts are conventionally associated with100
certain grammatical constructions. For example, asserting is conventionally associ-101
ated with declarative mood, questioning with interrogative mood, and ordering with102
imperatival mood. Theories of assertions, questions, and orders usually proceed from103
a semantic theory of their conventionalized mood.3 Just like other speech acts, the104
speech act of giving an argument is conventionally associated with some linguistic105
constructions, primarily—but, as we will see, not exclusively—with discourses of the106
form “P1, . . . , Pn . Therefore, C”. In order to develop a theory of the speech act of107
giving an argument, I propose we look at the semantics of arguments, starting from the108
semantics of argument connectives such as ‘therefore’. Following and improving on109
Pavese (2017), Sect. 3 argues that argument connectives are presupposition triggers.110
How does the proposed semantics bear on a theory of the speech act of giving (or111
making) an argument? Sect. 4 makes a preliminary proposal, which is then refined112
by looking at premise-less arguments and arguments without argument connectives.113
According to the resulting theory, giving an argument is possible only by taking certain114
entailment relations for granted. Giving an argument by a logical rule comes out as115
a specific case, wherein the entailment relations one takes for granted are formally116
codifiable.117
With a theory of arguments under our belt, Sect. 5 develops a response to the118
Structural Paradox. I propose that the lesson of the regress is that arguments are119
constitutively presuppositional. I show that the resulting theory of arguments affords a120
satisfactory response to the Structural Paradox as well as an explanatory account of121
why the structural regress can arise. Section 6 is devoted to a comparison with extant122
versions of the rule-following account: I argue that the response overcomes the main123
problems facing them, while retaining the rule-following account’s key insights. In124
particular, my proposal allows to overcome a revenge regress that faces the intentional125
construal of rule-following and can be shown to be more explanatory than a merely126
dispositional construal of rule-following. Section 7 rebuts some objections. Section 8127
concludes by returning to the Cognitive Paradox to locate the proposed solution128
within a bigger picture of speech acts and communication.129
3 Thus, for example, Stalnaker (1987)’s theory of assertion as consisting in adding a proposition to the
common ground proceeds from a standard semantics that assigns propositions to sentences with declarative
mood; Roberts (2018)’s theory of questions as imposing a partition on the common ground proceeds from
a standard semantics that associates sentences with interrogative mood with sets of exclusive propositions
(Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984)). Finally, the theory of orders as imposing preference ranking on the com-
mon grounds (Portner 2016; Starr 2020) proceeds from a semantics that assigns sentences with imperative
mood with properties rather than with propositions (Portner 2004, 2007).
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2 The set-up130
2.1 A common diagnosis131
One of the very first documented reactions to Lewis Carroll’s regress comes from132
Russell (1903, Sect. 38) who affirms that in order to overcome Carroll’s paradox:133
. . . we need, in fact, the notion of therefore, which is quite different from the134
notion of implies...135
Later, Winch (1958, 53) concurs with Russell’s diagnosis when he tells us:136
The actual process of drawing an inference . . . is something which cannot be137
represented as a logical formula.138
Perhaps even more explicitly, Dummett (1973, 303) states that Lewis Carroll’s139
‘discovery’ . . .140
. . . was that an argument of the form (A) cannot be identified with the conditional141
(B):142
(A) P. if P then Q. Therefore, Q.143
(B) If P and if P then Q, then Q.144
More recently, Smiley (1995, 725) also echoes Russell and Dummett:145
Carroll’s problem arose from his failure to distinguish between a deduction and146
the statement of a hypothetical proposition.147
What these verdicts have all in common is the idea that the regress brings out the148
contrast between arguments and argument schemas, on one hand, and conditionals149
and conditional schemas, on the other. Call this the ‘common diagnosis’.150
2.2 The rule-following account151
As it stands, the common diagnosis does little to address the Structural Paradox.152
Structural Paradox asks how it is possible to give an argument by modus ponens, in153
the light of the regress. Just saying that arguments are not the same as conditionals does154
not answer this question, unless it is explained how giving an argument is different155
from making a conditional assertion in such a way that is relevant to stopping the156
regress.157
The rule-following account is a prominent way of developing the common diagnosis158
into a more direct response to the Structural Paradox. According to the rule-following159
account:160
Claim 1: Rules are distinct from principles.161
Claim 2: Giving (or making) an argument by a rule is possible by following that rule.162
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What is a rule and what is a principle? Let the logical principle of modus ponens163
be the proposition expressed by quantifying over P and Q in (B), as in B*:4164
(B*) For every P and Q, if P and if P then Q, then Q.165
By contrast, a logical rule is often assumed to be what is expressed by an argument166
schema such as (A) above. For the purpose of this essay, let a logical rule be a relation167
holding between the schematic premises and the schematic conclusion. For example,168
the rule of modus ponens is a relation that holds between schematic premises P and169
If P then Q and the schematic conclusion Q in (A). This can be modeled as a set of170
ordered-pairs that have instances of the premises as their first elements and instances171
of the conclusion as their second element. The rule is sound if the relation is truth-172
preserving—i.e., every instance of the schematic premises entails the corresponding173
instance of the schematic conclusion. Let an instance of a rule be an ordered pair174
that has an instance of the schematic premises as first element and an instance of175
the conclusion as second element. For example, the ordered pair that has “Mary is176
English” and “If Mary is English then she is British” as first elements and “Mary is177
British” as second element is an instance of modus ponens. An argument exemplifies178
a rule just in case the ordered pair of its premises and its conclusion is an instance179
of that rule. A ‘modus ponens argument’—or an ‘argument by modus ponens’—is an180
argument that exemplifies the rule of modus ponens. An instance of a rule holds just181
in case its first element(s) cannot be true without its second element being true too.5182
The distinction between rules and principles is the moral of the regress that we are183
taught in our first logic course. And many prominent philosophers have embraced it184
over the years. Just to give two examples, according to Dennett (2002, p. 95ft5), a185
system’s logical rules cannot be replaced by principles, for that would trigger Lewis186
Carroll’s regress; according to Brandom (1994, p. 340), Lewis Carroll’s regress teaches187
us that there must be “basic rules of inference as well as truths” (cf. also Ryle (1945,188
p. 77); Brown (1954); Geach (1965); Peirce (1974); Gupta (2006); Rumfitt (2011, p.189
358); Boghossian (2000)).190
However, the rule-following account is not exhausted by the distinction between191
rules and principles. It makes the additional Claim 2, according to which arguing by192
modus ponens is possible by following a rule—where following a rule is not a matter193
of instantiating the principle as a further premise.194
While Claim 2 constitutes the rule-following account’s direct response to the Struc-195
tural Paradox, note that the response that it affords is merely negative. It does not tell196
us what following a rule in the course of an argument amounts to and how it is to be197
construed in such a way to block the regress. A satisfactory response to the Structural198
Paradox should provide a positive answer to:199
4 Because every true logic principle expresses the same coarse-grained proposition—the set including
every possible world—‘the proposition expressed by a sentence s’ in this context should not be understood
as the set of possible worlds where s is true. Rather, in this context, propositions are to be understood
either as linguistically structured propositions (cf. King 2007) or as metalinguistic propositions—the set of
possible worlds where s expresses a truth in the relevant language, along the model of Stalnaker (1978)’s
diagonal propositions.
5 In this characterization of logical rules, I am following MacFarlane (2004), who proposes we think of
formal/logical validity as a property of argument schemas, and of formal/logical entailment as a relation
between schematic premises and schematic conclusions.
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QUESTION How is following a rule in the course of giving (or making) an argument200
to be construed in such a way for it to be possible without regress?201
2.3 A dilemma for the rule-following account202
Now, rule-following can be understood either in merely dispositional terms or in203
intentional terms. According to the (merely) dispositional construal, following a rule204
is a matter of being disposed to conform to that rule in the appropriate circumstances205
and this disposition is not itself partly or entirely grounded on an attitude of the rule-206
follower that has the rule as its content. According to an intentional construal, instead,207
following a rule is a matter of being guided by the rule, where being guided by a rule208
involves grasping the rule—i.e., standing in an attitude that has the rule as its content.209
As Boghossian (2014) has recently pointed out, it is not clear that either construal of210
the rule-following account can afford a satisfactory answer to QUESTION.6211
The problem with the merely dispositional construal of rule-following is that it212
seems to simply postpone an answer to QUESTION. We wanted to know how giving213
an argument by modus ponens is possible without regress. Now, we are told (only)214
that giving an argument by modus ponens is possible by manifesting the disposition215
to conform to that rule. One might be forgiven for thinking that that is exactly what216
ought to be explained by a satisfactory solution of the structural paradox—i.e., how217
conforming to the rule is possible, without regress. The appeal to mere dispositions218
by itself does not help, for mere dispositions cannot explain themselves (Boghossian219
(2014, p. 14); Fodor (2008)).7220
This suggests we should look for a more substantive account of what conforming to221
a rule amounts to. According to the intentional construal, giving an argument by modus222
ponens is possible by being guided by that rule and this in turns requires an attitude223
towards that rule. As I understand it, the intentional construal is not incompatible224
with thinking of rule-following in dispositional terms. What truly distinguishes the225
intentional construal from the merely dispositional construal of rule-following is that226
on the intentional construal, the relevant rule-following dispositions are explained227
at least in part in terms of guidance by an attitude of the rule-follower towards the228
relevant rule.229
“The worry with the intentional construal of rule-following is that it seems to run230
afoul of what we might call a ‘revenge regress’.” If rule-following is a matter of being231
guided by an attitude towards a rule, then the rule ought to be sufficiently general to232
6 Although Boghossian (2014) focuses on the version of the regress that arises for reasoning, on the
assumption that the so-called taking condition holds for reasoning, the dilemma he raises also extends to
Lewis Carroll’s original version of the regress that, as we have seen, arises in the context of an argument.
7 People have responded to this argument in a variety of ways. Broome (2014, p. 21) tries to address this
objection by proposing that one reasons from P to C provided that (i) one’s belief P causes one’s belief C;
(ii) one reaches C by following a rule and (ii) that doing so ‘seems right to one.’ However, this proposal
runs into several possible counterexamples (Valaris 2017). Moreover, dispositionalism faces many other
problems (cf. Pavese 2020). For example, we would want an account of following a rule that could be
appealed to in an explanation of how one might come to justifiably endorse a conclusion by reasoning in a
certain manner. But how can a disposition to follow a rule justify a transition? Dispositions to follow rules
are not the sort of things that could justify you in acting in the way you are disposed to act (Wittgenstein
(1953, p. 258); Kripke (1982)).
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guide one in a variety of circumstances. If so, the question arises of how the rule guides233
one in a specific case. On a prima facie plausible Application Model, rules guide by234
being applied—where applying a rule consists in going through an inference of the235
following sort:236
Application Model237
a the rule requires/licenses doing X,238
b the present case falls under the rule and in this case doing X would amount239
to doing Y240
C the rule requires/licenses doing Y in the present case.241
For example, on the Application Model, following the rule of modus ponens in242
an argument would require that one appreciate that the rule of modus p nens licenses243
conclusions of the form Q from premises of the form P and If P then Q, that one244
check whether the premises, e.g., Mary is Italian and if Mary is Italian then she is245
European has the form P and If P then Q, and that one conclude that the rule licenses246
the conclusion Mary is European. In other words, following the rule would require247
making an inference to what the rule requires/licenses in the present case. But this248
inference itself, qua inference, will also presumably require following a rule. This in249
turn will require applying the rule to the specific case at issue, and hence will require250
making another inference, which will also be rule-guided. And so on. A revenge251
regress threatens the intentional construal of rule-following when understood along252
the Application Model.8253
2.4 Taking stock and planning forward254
Let us take stock. The rule-following account gives a prima facie satisfactory response255
to the Structural Paradox, by telling us that giving an argument by modus ponens256
is possible by following a rule. But trouble arises when one asks what following a257
rule amounts to. The merely dispositional construal fails to provide an explanatory258
account of rule-following. The intentional construal promises to do better, by explain-259
ing rule-following in terms of being guided by a rule. But on the Application Model of260
what guidance amounts to, the intentional construal of rule-following faces a revenge261
regress. As a way of overcoming his dilemma, Boghossian (2014) recommends adopt-262
ing a sort of primitivism on which rule-following is taken as an unexplained primitive.263
But as he points out, primitivism simply gives up on the project of reaching an explana-264
tory account of rule-following.265
Can the intentional construal of rule-following explain guidance by a rule without266
facing the revenge regress? This is where, I suggest, looking at how we in fact argue267
might help—the idea being that a study of how we do in fact argue might cast light on268
how giving an argument by a logical rule is possible without regress. As we will see, this269
study of arguments will motivate unpacking the common diagnosis into a diagnosis270
8 For a discussion of the application model (Boghossian 2003; Padro 2015; Boghossian 2014; Valaris 2017;
Besson 2019).
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which retains the key insights of the rule-following account but can overcome the271
aforementioned difficulties.272
3 Argument connectives as presupposition triggers273
Consider the following argument:274
Argument 1 Mary is English. Therefore, she is brave.275
What is the contribution of the argument connective ‘therefore’ to it? Grice (1975,276
pp. 44–45) famously put forward an answer to this question:277
If I say (smugly), “He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave,” I have certainly278
committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case279
that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman.280
But while I have said that he is an Englishman and said that he is brave . . . I do281
not want to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking,282
false should the consequence in question fail to hold. So some implicatures are283
conventional . . .284
According to Grice, an argument such as Argument 1 asserts its premise (that285
Mary is English) and asserts its conclusion (that Mary is brave). But because of the286
contribution of ‘therefore’, in addition to asserting its premise and its conclusion,287
Argument 1 also communicates Target Content—i.e., the proposition that Mary’s288
being brave follows from her being English:289
Target Content That Mary is brave follows from the proposition that Mary is English.290
Generalizing, Grice thought that in virtue of the contribution to it of ‘therefore’, an291
argument of the form of Argument Schema communicates Target Content Schema:292
Argument Schema P1, . . ., Pn . Therefore C .293
Target Content Schema C follows from P1, . . ., Pn .294
Why did Grice think that? Grice’s rationale for thinking that, e.g., Target Content295
is communicated by Argument 1 is that, by using Argument 1, one clearly commits296
oneself to Mary’s being brave following from her being English. Hence, Target Con-297
tent must be communicated by Argument 1. Though communicated by Argument 1,298
Grice thought that Target Content is not asserted by Argument 1. That is so because299
asserted/said content can be directly challenged. For example, one could challenge300
the premise asserted by Argument 1 by saying “That is false: Mary is not English!”.301
Similarly for its conclusion. The fact that its premise and its conclusion can be directly302
challenged is evidence that Argument 1 asserts both that Mary is brave and that Mary303
is English. By contrast, although Target Content is communicated by Argument 1,304
one could not challenge Target Content directly by using “That is false” in reply to305
Argument 1. In fact, the contrast between (1-a) and (1-b) is striking:306
(1) a. Mary is English. Therefore, she is brave. *That is false/That is not true.307
b. From the fact that Mary is English, it follows from that that she is brave.308
That is false/that is not true.309
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Note that both (1-a) and (1-b) communicate the proposition that Mary’s being brave fol-310
lows from her being English. In other words, they both communicate Target Content.311
But whereas this proposition can be directly challenged in (1-b), the same proposition312
cannot be directly challenged in (1-a). This is evidence that, although Target Content313
is conveyed by Argument 1, it is not asserted by it. On the basis of these considera-314
tions, Grice concluded that Argument 1 asserts that Mary is English, asserts that she315
is brave, and also communicates Target Content but without asserting it.316
What is, exactly, the status of Target Content, then? The fact that Target Con-317
tent cannot be directly challenged by itself is compatible with Target Content being318
entailed by Argument 1. For example, “Mary is English” entails that “Mary is Euro-319
pean,” but one could not challenge the proposition that Mary is European simply by320
using “That is false” in response to “Mary is English.” Along similar lines, one might321
think that, when one uses Argument 1, one entails that Mary’s being brave follows322
from her being English without explicitly asserting it.323
However, as Pavese (2017) has argued, several considerations tell against the entail-324
ment analysis.9 Like Grice, Pavese observes that by using Argument 1, one commits325
oneself to Mary’s being brave following from her being English. Hence, Target Con-326
tent must be conveyed by Argument 1. However, she argues that Target Content is327
not entailed nor asserted by Argument 1. Rather, it is conveyed via a presupposition.328
According to Pavese (2017), primary evidence for this claim is that argument connec-329
tives such as ‘therefore’ satisfy the usual linguistic tests for presupposition triggers.330
Spelling out Pavese (2017)’s argument for this conclusion requires some steps.331
A prominent test for spotting presupposition triggers is the projection test: the332
crucial difference between entailment and presuppositions is that the latter project out333
of embeddings (Karttunen 1973, 1974; Beaver 2001). For example, consider (2-a):334
(2) a. It is the knave that stole the tarts.335
b. The knave stole something.336
c. Somebody stole the tarts. Target Content*337
(2-a) entails (2-b): it is a sign that (2-a) entails (2-b) that if one embeds (2-a) under338
negation, the resulting sentence does not convey (2-b) any longer. For example, the339
negation (3-a) does not convey (2-b) any longer. By contrast, consider (2-c). It is a sign340
that the proposition expressed by (2-c) is presupposed by (2-a)—rather than entailed341
or explicitly stated by (2-a)—that if one embeds (2-a) under negation (3-a), under a342
question (3-b), in a conditional (3-c), under a possibility modal (3-d), or an evidential343
modal (3-e), the resulting sentences still convey the proposition expressed by (2-c).344
Because the proposition expressed by (2-c)—Target Content*—is still conveyed by345
(3-a)–(3-e), Target Content* passes the projection test and that is evidence that it is346
presupposed by (2-a)—rather than entailed or asserted by (2-a):347
(3) a. It is not the knave that stole the tarts. (Negation)348
b. Is the knave that stole the tarts? (Question)349
9 Other argument connectives, such as ‘hence’ and ‘so’, are also presupposition triggers. Because dif-
ferences between different argument connectives will not matter, for simplicity here I will just focus on
‘therefore’.
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c. If it is the knave that stole the tarts, he will be punished. (Antecedent of350
Conditionals)351
d. Maybe/It is possible that it’s the knave that stole the tarts. (Possibility352
Modals)353
e. Presumably/probably, it’s the knave that stole the tarts. (Evidential modal,354
probability adverb)355
Now, what we want is to use the projection test to see whether, e.g., Target Con-356
tent is presupposed by Argument 1 (rather than entailed or asserted). In order to do357
so—by analogy with how we showed that Target Content* is presupposed by (2-a)—358
we would have to embed Argument 1 under negation, questions, conditionals, and359
modals, and then see if Target Content is still communicated by the resulting con-360
structions. But a difficulty arises: Argument 1 cannot be embedded as it is, because361
it is not a sentence but, rather, a discourse.362
To remedy this, we ought to turn Argument 1 into a sentence. We can easily do363
so, by turning the period in it into a conjunction and a comma. This gives us:364
Argument 2 Mary is English and, therefore, she is brave.365
Like Argument 1, Argument 2 also conveys Target Content, for the same reasons366
Argument 1 does: by uttering Argument 2, one also commits oneself to Mary’s367
braveness following from her being English. But Argument 2 is a sentence, and so368
it can embed within wider linguistic contexts. So Pavese (2017)’s idea was that, in369
order to find out whether Target Content is presupposed by Argument 1, we see if370
it is presupposed by Argument 2—i.e., we look at whether Target Content projects371
when Argument 2 is embedded within wider linguistic contexts.372
So, now, what happens when Argument 2 is embedded under negation and other373
linguistic environments? Interestingly, just like a presupposition, Target Content374
projects out of embeddings, of antecedents of conditionals (4-a), of questions (4-b),10375
as well as out of negation (4-c), possibility modals (4-d), and evidential modals (4-e),376
as can be seen from the fact that all of (4-a)-(4-e) still convey that Mary’s being brave377
follows from her being English:378
(4) a. If Mary is English and, therefore, brave, she will act as such. (Conditional)379
b. Is Maria English and, therefore, brave? (Question)380
c. It is not the case that Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Negation)381
d. It might be that Maria is English and, therefore, brave.s (Possibility Modals)382
e. Presumably, Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Evidential modal, prob-383
ability adverb)384
Consider, for example, (4-b): it does not ask whether Mary’s braveness follows from385
her being English. Rather, it asks whether Mary is English. Consider how unnatural it386
would be to reply to (4-b) by ‘No’, simply on the ground that Mary’s braveness does not387
follow from her being English, even though the speaker knows that Mary is English.388
Hence, Target Content can project from embeddings just like presuppositions do.389
10 See also Neta (2013, pp. 394–395).
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On these bases, Pavese (2017) argued that Target Content passes the first main390
test for being presupposed by Argument 1. The second main linguistic test for pre-391
suppositions is the not-at-issuedness test, which we have already discussed in part.392
Presuppositions cannot be directly challenged—i.e., for example, one cannot directly393
challenge the presupposition in (2-a) with (5):394
(5) *That is not true/That is false!395
If one were to use (5) in response to (2-a), one would be challenging the claim that396
the knave stole the tarts—not the presupposition that somebody stole the tarts. But as397
we have seen at the outset, when conveyed by Argument 1 (or Argument 2), Target398
Content above satisfies also the not-at-issuedness test, for when conveyed by those399
constructions, it cannot be directly challenged, as evidenced by infelicity in the initial400
(1-a).401
This is not to say, of course, that arguments cannot ever be challenged. For example,402
(6-a)–(6-c) do challenge Argument 1’s Target Content:403
(6) a. Wait a moment! Mary’s braveness does not follow from her being English!404
b. Wait a minute! That argument is not valid.405
c. Hey, wait a minute! Not all English people are brave!406
However, this way of challenging Target Content is indirect, for notice that it requires407
taking distance from the at issue-content of the argument. In fact, Von Fintel (2004) and408
Tonhauser et al. (2013) use the ‘wait a minute’ test precisely for spotting presupposition409
triggers. This test uncovers the presence of presupposition triggers by testing for410
whether presuppositions can be indirectly challenged, as when we reply to (2-a) by411
(7) with locutions such as ‘wait a minute’:412
(7) Wait a minute! Nobody stole the tarts!413
In conclusion, the two main tests for spotting presuppositions—the projection test414
and the non-at-issuedness test—suggests that Target Content is presupposed by415
Argument 1. Because the same results are obtained by changing examples, gener-416
alizing, these tests suggest that propositions of the form of Target Content Schema417
are presupposed by arguments of the form of Argument Schema. Pavese (2017)418
concluded that ‘therefore’ satisfies the two main tests for presupposition triggers.419
The final consideration that Pavese (2017) put forward on behalf of the presup-420
positional analysis of ‘therefore’ is that the machinery of local contexts—standardly421
invoked in the study of presuppositions (e.g., Heim 1983; Karttunen 1974; Rothschild422
2011; Schlenker 2009, 2010)—enters center stage in an explanation of the context-423
sensitivity of constructions embedding ‘therefore’. For example, consider (8):424
(8) Mario is progressive. Therefore, he is from the North of Italy.425
Although one’s geographical origins are surely not entailed by one’s political prefer-426
ences and although in many contexts arguing as in (8) would not be felicitous (for in427
Italy being progressive is hardly an indication of one’s origins), the argument in (8)428
could be given felicitously in a context where a sociological experiment is conducted429
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with a group of subjects that includes Mario and where all the progressive subjects430
of the experiment turn out to come from the North. The presuppositional analysis can431
predict this pattern of context-sensitivity for it is commonly accepted that presupposi-432
tions are satisfied relative to their so-called local contexts: the local context for ‘He is,433
therefore, from the North’ in (8)—the global set of assumptions in the current context434
augmented with the sentence ‘Mario is a progressive’—supports that Mark is from435
the North.436
These are the main arguments given by Pavese (2017) for the presuppositional437
analysis of ‘therefore’. Many other considerations — not discussed by Pavese (2017)—438
point in favor of the same analysis. First of all, the presuppositional analysis of439
‘therefore’ provides a natural explanation for why (8) sounds Moorean-paradoxical440
Hlobil (2014, p. 421):441
(9) ??Mary is English. Therefore, she is brave, but I do not believe/know that her442
being brave follows from her being English.443
For it is a general fact about presuppositions that they cannot be canceled if unembed-444
ded and that commitment to the presupposed content cannot be retracted, on pain of445
Moorean paradoxicality, as evidenced by the weirdness of the following continuations:446
(10) It is the doctor who stole the tarts. ??But nobody did. ?? But I do not447
believe/know that anybody stole the tarts.448
Moreover, Target Content can be canceled when embedded, as in (11), which is449
exactly what one would expect if it were presupposed:450
(11) Mark is under the impression that Mary is English and therefore brave. But of451
course her courage does not follow from her being English.452
In addition, ‘therefore’ satisfies additional tests for strong presupposition triggers453
suggested by Pearson (2010) and Abrusán (2016). Strong presuppositions triggers such454
as ‘stop’ cannot felicitously follow a report where the speaker retracts commitment to455
their presuppositions Pearson (2010), as in (4-b) and (12-b):456
(12) a. ??Well, I do not know if Jill ever smoked. But she stopped now.457
b. ??Well, I do not know if Jill ever smoked. But Mary knows that Jill smoked.458
459
The presuppositions of ‘strong’ triggers cannot even be suspended, as observed by460
Abrusán (2016, p. 167):461
(13) a. I have no idea whether John read the proposal. But if Bill read it too, let’s462
ask them to confer and simply give us a yes/no response. ( Abusch (2010))463
464
b. ?? I have no idea whether my husband is cheating on me. But if I discover465
that he is, I am going to kill him.466
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In (4-b)-(12-b), a strong presupposition trigger is not licensed in the antecedent of a467
conditional, after a statement that expresses ignorance about whether the presupposi-468
tion is true.469
‘Therefore’ satisfies both tests: it does not felicitously follow retraction, as evi-470
denced by the infelicity of (14-a), nor can its presupposition be suspended, as evidenced471
by the infelicity of (14-b):472
(14) a. ??Well, I do not know if her braveness follows from her being English.473
But Mary is English. And therefore, she is brave.474
b. ??I have no idea whether all English people are brave. But if Mary is475
English and therefore brave, she will act as such.476
On this diagnostics, ‘therefore’ qualifies as a strong presupposition trigger.477
Does the fact that ‘therefore’ satisfies all of these tests for presupposition triggers—478
i.e., non-at-issuedness, projectability, context-sensitivity, and cancelability—tell479
against the main alternative explanations to the presuppositional analysis? The main480
alternative explanation, that as we have seen was mentioned en passant by Grice in481
the passage quoted, is that Target Content is conventionally implied by ‘therefore’.11482
Now, many philosophers and linguists have pointed out that the boundaries between483
conventional implicatures and presupposition triggers are notoriously hard to draw484
(e.g., Karttunen and Peters 1979; Potts et al. 2005; Potts 2007, 2015). However, the485
recent literature has developed more refined tests for telling apart presuppositions and486
conventional implicatures.487
Potts (2015, p. 31) proposes we distinguish presuppositions and conventional488
implicatures on the basis of their pattern of projectability—the idea being that con-489
ventional implicatures project even more massively than presuppositions. Consider490
appositives—a paradigmatic example of conventional implicatures (cf. Potts 2007, p.491
668). They mandatorily project out of standard plugs such as attitude reports:492
(15) George believes that Mary, who is fun, is not fun.493
This criterion proposed Potts (2015, p. 31) speaks in favor of the presuppositional494
analysis for ‘therefore’, for the content associated with ‘therefore’ can be plugged by495
belief reports:496
(16) George believes that Mary is English and, therefore, brave. (Belief operator)497
(16) can certainly be used to ascribe to George not just the beliefs that Mary is English498
and that she is brave, but also the (implicit) belief in the entailment from Mary’s being499
English to her being brave. On this reading, Target Content does not project from500
(16).501
Presuppositions project less massively than paradigmatic examples of conventional502
implicatures such as appositives also in a second respect. As Mandelkern (2016) has503
observed, the content of appositives projects even when it is locally entailed. For504
example, ‘who is fun’ still projects in sentences such as (17-a) and (17-b):505
11 Others have followed Grice (1975) in this. See, e.g., Potts (2007, p. 2) and Davis (2014, Sect. 2). Bach
(1999), Bach (2006, Sect. 10) argue against Grice (1975)’s view.
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(17) a. If Mary is fun, then she’ll, who is fun, come to the party.506
b. If Mary is fun and Mary, who is fun, is in town, then she’ll come to the507
party.508
By contrast, the presupposition associated with ‘stop’ (that Mary used to smoke)509
projects from (18-a) but does not project from either (18-b) or (18-c), where the510
proposition that Mary used to smoke is already locally entailed:511
(18) a. If Mary stopped smoking then she can come to the party.512
b. If Mary used to smoke then she stopped smoking.513
c. If Mary used to smoke and she stopped smoking then she can come to the514
party.515
On the basis of this and other similar observations, Mandelkern (2016, p. 392) suggests516
the following necessary condition for presuppositions:517
Lack of preservation : If an assertion of a sentence s licenses an inference to a propo-518
sition p in a context c, then s presupposes p in c only if s does519
not warrant an inference to p when p is locally entailed.520
Lack of preservation also is satisfied by discourses featuring ‘therefore’. For exam-521
ple, Target Content projects in (19-a)—where it is not locally entailed—but not from522
(19-b) or (19-c)—where it is locally entailed:523
(19) a. If Mary is English and, therefore, brave then she will act bravely.524
b. If being English entails being brave, then Mary is English and, therefore,525
brave.526
c. If being English entails being brave and Mary is English and, therefore,527
brave, then she will act bravely.528
Hence, ‘therefore’ satisfies another necessary condition for presupposition triggers529
that standard conventional implicatures such as appositives do not satisfy.530
Before closing this discussion, let me clarify that the claim that ‘therefore’ is a531
presupposition trigger is compatible with the relevant Target Content sometimes532
not projecting out of embeddings. For example, as some speakers report, (4-c) can533
also have a non-projective reading. On this non-projective reading, we are not sim-534
ply denying that Mary is English. We might be denying that her braveness follows535
from her being English. The presence of this projective reading is, however, compat-536
ible with ‘therefore”s being a presupposition trigger. For it is generally the case that537
negated sentences embedding presupposition triggers license non-projective readings.538
For example, consider (20):539
(20) The tarts were not stolen by the knave: there is no knave.540
In (20), the presupposition that the knave exists obviously does not project. Several pos-541
sible explanations for non-projective readings under negation have been proposed.12542
12 According to one such explanation (Horn (1985)), negation is ambiguous between a presupposition-
preserving negation and a presupposition-denying negation (cf. Beaver and Geurts 2014.) According to
another, we might be dealing with an example of local accommodation (Heim 1983). For an overview of
these issues, (see Pavese 2021).
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Whatever explanation works best for the non-projective reading of (20) can plausibly543
be extended to explain the non-projective reading of (4-c). So, ‘therefore”s being a544
presupposition trigger is compatible with there being non-projective readings of the545
discourses where ‘therefore’ features, in so far as the general pattern of projection is546
otherwise alike that of other presuppositions. What seems clear is that the pattern of547
projection of the content contributed by ‘therefore’ aligns much more clearly with that548
of presupposition triggers than with that of conventional implicatures, in that it can549
be plugged by belief reports and does not project when locally entailed. I conclude550
that the evidence is overwhelming that, when it comes to argument connectives such551
as ‘therefore’, we are dealing with genuine presupposition triggers.552
4 A theory of arguments553
4.1 Presupposing a rule versus presupposing an instance of the rule554
If ‘therefore’ is a presupposition trigger, what follows about the structure of arguments?555
The discussion in the last section motivates taking arguments of the form of556
Argument Schema to convey that C follows from P1, . . . , Pn through a semantic557
presupposition. Semantic presuppositions are properties of sentences and discourses558
types and, as such, are not to be confused with pragmatic presuppositions—which559
are instead attitudes that one holds towards a proposition in virtue of taking its truth560
for granted. Yet, semantic presuppositions are related to pragmatic presuppositions561
by certain bridge principles. In particular, following Stalnaker (1975), we can assume562
that, if a discourse d semantically presupposes p, then one would, by using d, prag-563
matically presuppose p. If so, if d semantically presupposes p, then one would, when564
using d, take for granted that p.13 If so, then this semantic analysis tells us something565
interesting about the speech act of giving an argument—i.e., that when arguing from566
‘P1, . . . , Pn’ to ‘C’, one takes for granted that C follows from P1, . . . , Pn .567
As it stands, however, the current analysis is incomplete. When one argues from568
‘Mary is English’ to ‘Mary is brave’, one is not just presupposing that her being brave569
follows from her being English. Plausibly—and whether knowingly or not—one pre-570
supposes that Mary’s being brave follows from her being English by presupposing571
something more general—that quite generally English people are brave. After all, as572
we have seen, both (6-a)-(6-c) above are legitimate ways of challenging Argument 1.573
Moreover, this more general presupposition can be seen to project out of embeddings574
(4-a)-(4-e), just like the more specific one. Finally, one’s presupposing that English575
quite generally are brave explains one’s disposition to presuppose that Mary’s brave-576
ness follows from her being English in the course of arguing from ‘Mary is English’577
to ‘Mary is brave’.578
Now, consider an argument by modus ponens. As the presupposition tests suggest,579
this sort of argument presupposes that the conclusion follows from those premises—580
i.e., that an instance of modus ponens holds. By analogy with the previous case,581
however, it seems that at least in many cases, by giving an argument by modus ponens,582
13 Cf. (Stalnaker 1977, 2002).
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whether knowingly or not, one presupposes that an instance of the rule holds by583
presupposing something more general—i.e., that the rule is generally valid. After584
all, this more general presupposition too can be indirectly challenged (e.g, “Wait a585
moment! Not every instance of MP is valid!”) and just like the more specific one,586
it can be seen to project out of embeddings. Finally, and very importantly, one’s587
presupposing that the rule is valid would explain one’s disposition to presuppose that588
an instance of the rule holds in an argument by that rule.589
How plausible is it that in arguments by modus ponens, one presupposes that that590
rule is valid? In some cases, it is pretty clear that one does: consider a logic teacher591
who develops a proof on the board and who reaches the conclusion by saying “C, by592
modus ponens.” It is overwhelmingly plausible that in this case, the teacher is taking593
for granted, and asking others to take for granted, that the general rule of modus ponens594
is valid.595
Yet, one might think that not every argument by modus ponens can presuppose596
the general validity of the rule. Consider for example, Professor Vann McGee, who597
famously does not believe that modus ponens is generally valid (McGee 1985) and598
hence presumably would not be disposed to presuppose the validity of this rule. Yet,599
Vann McGee can still argue by modus ponens.600
In response, could not Professor McGee be presupposing only that a suitably601
restricted rule is valid? That is compatible with him being skeptical that the rule does602
not have any counterexample. Yet, it might seem implausible that in every argument603
by modus ponens, what is presupposed is something about rules, their validity, or their604
restrictions thereof. After all, we start arguing by modus ponens well before we know605
anything about logical rules and validity. Think of the average pre-college individual606
arguing by modus ponens: are they really presupposing its validity? Whatever stance607
we take on this question, it would be nice to have a way of distinguishing arguments608
one makes by invoking a rule (as the logician case) from arguments where a rule is609
not explicitly invoked (as in more ordinary cases). Just saying that, in both cases, the610
validity of the rule is presupposed, in the same exact way, will not account for this611
intuitive distinction.612
These considerations suggests the following unifying strategy. As our presupposi-613
tion tests suggest, I will take arguments to presuppose that their conclusion follows614
from their premises. And I will take arguments to presuppose that in virtue of pre-615
supposing something more general—i.e., that a general rule, or a suitable restriction616
thereof, is valid. But while in some cases—as when one invokes the rule in the course617
of an argument—presupposing the validity of the rule is a matter of being in a non-618
tacit presuppositional attitude towards that rule, in other cases, one presupposes it in619
a weaker, tacit, sense. As Lewis (1969, pp. 64–68) puts it, this is the sense in which620
competent speakers of their language presuppose the semantic conventions for the621
language they speak, while being unable to articulate them: ‘non-knowingly’: ‘non-622
verbally’, ‘tacitly’, or even in sensu diviso. According to this proposal, that a rule—or623
a restriction thereof—is valid in one’s language is just one among the semantic con-624
ventions that one presupposes (tacitly or not) when speaking that language. Positing625
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this presupposition is explanatory as it explains our coming to see and presuppose that626
an instance of the rule holds in the course of an argument by that rule.14627
The next subsection shows how to model the presuppositional aspect of ‘there-628
fore’, assuming a dynamic approach to the semantics of arguments. Because the629
general argument developed in this essay does not depend on this particular semantic630
proposal—which has the illustrative purpose of making the general proposal formally631
cogent—the reader can skip it and jump to Sect. 4.3 without losing any step in the632
philosophical argument.633
4.2 A dynamic analysis634
On a dynamic treatment of presuppositions, it is natural to think of presuppositions635
as special kinds of tests. In dynamic semantics, a test is an expression whose function636
is to check whether the context satisfies certain constraints. The most paradigmatic637
example of a test is Veltman (1996, p. 9)’s ‘might’:638
Dynamic Might c[might-φ] =639
• c, if c + φ = ∅;640
• ∅ , if c + φ = ∅.641
Dynamic Might is a test that checks whether the context c is compatible with the642
prejacent φ. Let <φ> be the set of possible worlds where φ is true and let a context643
c augmented with φ (= c + φ) be the intersection of c with the set of φ -worlds—the644
worlds where φ is true (= c ∩<φ>). Dynamic Might returns the context c if c + φ is645
not empty and it returns the empty set if c + φ is empty—if φ is not compatible with646
c.647
From Dynamic Might plus Duality, we get another test—Dynamic Must—which648
also runs a test on the context but this time it checks whether the context supports φ649
(von Fintel and Gillies (2007, p. 54); Willer (2013)):650
Duality must-φ = ¬ might ¬-φ.651
Dynamic Must c[must-φ] =652
• c if c  φ;653
• ∅ if c  φ.654
Dynamic Must above returns c if c supports φ—‘c  φ’—and the empty set if c does655
not support φ. Support between a context c and a sentence σ is defined inductively as656
follows:657
14 According to Lewis (1969, 64-68), one presupposes p in sensu diviso just in case one is disposed to
presuppose each of its instances. However, I am inclined to think of tacit presuppositions along the lines
of Stalnaker (1975)’s notion of presupposition, rather than in terms of presuppositions in sensu diviso. For
Stalnaker (1975) understands presuppositions in a sufficiently liberal way to encompass tacit presupposi-
tions. As he puts it, presupposing p just in case one takes the truth of a proposition p for granted, where
taking the truth of p for granted is an attitude one can bear to p whether or not one has consciously thought
about whether p.
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Support658
1. If σ has the form p, c  σ just in case, p is true at every world in c—i.e., for659
all w ∈ c: w ∈ <p>;660
2. If σ has the form ¬φ, c  σ just in case c  φ;661
3. If σ has the form φ & ψ , c  σ just in case c  φ and c  ψ .662
‘Therefore’ is similar to ‘must’: ‘must’ imposes that the context supports a con-663
clusion and ‘therefore’ imposes that the context augmented with the premises entails664
the conclusion. But ‘must’ and ‘therefore’ also differ in important ways. For one665
thing,‘must’ is not plausibly a presupposition trigger. For example, (21) is not infelic-666
itous if it is not known in the context that Mary is in Holland:667
(21) If Mary must be in Holland, she cannot be in Paris.668
Pavese (2017)’s suggestion is that ‘therefore’ differs from other tests, in that the check-669
ing is done by the presupposition triggered by ‘therefore’, rather than by its core670
content. ‘Therefore’-discourses are infelicitous if the checking is not positive, like671
in the case of ‘must’-sentences. But in the case of ‘therefore’, the infelicity is due672
to presupposition failure. If so, in order to capture ‘therefore”s distinctive projective673
behavior, it is best to model the semantic entry for ‘therefore’ along the lines of Beaver674
(2001, pp. 156–162)’s presuppositional operator ‘δ’:675
Dynamic δ c [δ-φ]
{
c if c  φ
undefined if c  φ
676
Dynamic δ is also a test—and it also tests for whether the context supports φ—677
but is a special kind of test, in that it returns ‘undefined’ rather than the empty set678
when the context does not support φ. The difference between these two ‘fail’ values—679
undefinedness versus the empty set—is important. A semantic entry that returns the680
empty set receives a non-fail value—that of a tautology—under negation. But in order681
to account for the projection of the presupposition from a sentence containing ‘δ’ to682
its negation, the negation of that sentence must also receive a fail value if the sentence683
does. Choosing ‘undefined’, rather than the empty set, gives the desired result—i.e.,684
that the negation of the sentence containing ‘δ’ will also be undefined.685
So far so good. Now, the entry for ‘therefore’ cannot be exactly the same as686
‘δ’, because ‘δ’ does not take premises. By contrast, ‘therefore’ can—and in fact687
must—have an antecedent. Note that the following antecedent-less discourses are not688
felicitous in English:689
(22) a. ??Therefore, streets are wet (looking at the rain pouring outside).690
b. ??Therefore, either it is raining or it is not raining.691
So the entry for ‘therefore’ ought to differ from that of ‘δ’ accordingly.692
With these preliminaries, consider the following dynamic entry, where be a non-693
empty set of premises φ1, . . . , φn and let c +  be the intersection of the context c694
with every element in  (c +  = c ∩ <φ1> ∩ . . . ∩ <φn>, for every φ1, . . . φn in695
). In order to model the general presupposition about the validity of logical rules, the696
context c should be thought to include also the semantic conventions that the speakers697
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in that context presuppose to be true of the language they speak and that are commonly698
known among the participants to the conversation. Given this, consider the following699
dynamic entry:700
Dynamic Therefore c [, therefore − ψ] =
{
c[] if c +  ψ
undefined if c +  ψ701
According to Dynamic Therefore, the result of giving an argument is to update the702
context with its premises, having checked that so augmented the context supports the703
conclusion. Because it returns undefined, rather than the empty set, when the checking704
is negative, Dynamic Therefore can account for the projection of presuppositions705
from, e.g., a sentence such as ‘Mary is English and, therefore, brave’ to its negation.706
Dynamic Therefore can model simple arguments of the form ‘P1, . . . , Pn , therefore707
C’. A problem with Dynamic Therefore is that it fails to capture uses of ‘therefore’708
that have not premises but other arguments as antecedents, as when one argues by709
conditional proof, by reductio, or by cases. For example, consider:710
Argument A711
P , Therefore, C . Therefore, if P then C .712
If we apply Dynamic Therefore to this example, updating c with ‘P , Therefore, C’713
will return the context c updated with the premise P . And the second ‘therefore’ will714
test for whether that context supports ‘if P then C’. This is not the right interpretation715
of an argument by conditional proof, whose conclusion ought to discharge the premise716
P . In order to get the right interpretation of Argument A, we need to make sure that717
the second ‘therefore’ does not occur under the scope of the premise P . In order to718
achieve this result, more structure ought to be added to the argumentative discourse.719
Indexes can be used to this effect:720
Argument A721
P1, Therefore1, C . Therefore0, if P then C .722
The fact that the index of the last ‘therefore’ is not the same as that of the antecedent723
argument’s premise P1 indicates that the conclusion of Argument A does not occur724
within the scope of that premise. What ‘therefore0’ tests is the context antecedent to the725
update with the argument ‘P1, Therefore1, C’—i.e., it tests c0, not c1. So, capturing726
arguments such as Argument A requires imposing a syntax on argumentative dis-727
courses that can track the anaphoric relations between ‘therefore’ and its antecedents;728
it also requires contexts to be ordered as the results of subsequent updates.729
Simplifying a bit, let contexts be totally ordered (<ci , . . . , cn>) by the number of730
updates that they result from. Let the initial context be c0 and for any other cn such that731
n>0, let cn−1 be defined. We are now in position to reach a more general semantic entry732
for ‘therefore’, that also covers arguments that have other arguments as antecedents.
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In this entry, ‘therefore’ is a unary connective (taking only one argument—i.e., its733
conclusion) and its index signals which context it should be understood as testing:734




c j if j = i & ci  ψ
ci if i = j & i < j & ci  ψ
unde f ined if ci  ψ
736
Unpacking: when the argument has a simple ‘Premises + Conclusion’ structure,737
‘therefore’ is indexed to its premises and so it tests a context just updated with them.738
In this case, ci = c j , so the first clause kicks in. If the result of ‘thereforei ’ testing the739
context c j is positive, it returns c j . When the antecedent is a complex argument (such740
as an argument by conditional proof like Argument A), instead, ‘therefore”s index741
will refer back to the context prior to updating it with the premise of the subargument742
‘P1. Therefore1, C’ and in this case the second clause of Dynamic Therefore* kicks743
in. In conclusion, Dynamic Therefore* improves on Dynamic Therefore in that it744
can account for uses of ‘therefore’ in simple as well as in complex arguments.15745
4.3 Extending the analysis746
According to the current proposal, giving an argument requires presupposing that cer-747
tain entailment relations between its antecedents and its conclusions hold. As it stands,748
this analysis is restricted in scope: because it is modeled along a semantics for argument749
connectives, it does not encompass arguments that are made without argument con-750
nectives; moreover, because it focuses on arguments with argument connectives such751
as ‘therefore’, which require an antecedent, it does not seem to cover zero-premises752
arguments, which have no antecedent. This section extends the current analysis to753
these sorts of arguments.754
Arguments without argument connectives A logic teacher gives his students pas-755
sages where no argument connectives are there to indicate the conclusion—where756
part of the exercise is to figure out the structure of the argument without linguistic757
flags (Exercise).16 Informal conversation may also proceed this way: with the right758
intonation, a connectives-free discourse with premises and conclusion can be used to759
make an argument. Are these practices in contradiction with the current analysis?760
As is known in speech act theory, the same speech act can be made by using761
linguistic constructions that are different from those conventionally associated with it.762
Just to give one example, making a request does not also require the imperative mood,763
as one might request the salt by asking a question “Can you pass the salt?” The same764
is true for assertions and orders (cf., e.g., Roberts 2018; Murray and Starr 2020). We765
should expect the same to be true for arguments—i.e., that arguments can be made766
without using the expressions conventionally associated with them.767
15 For the purpose of this paper, this sketch of the semantics will do. For a systematic discussion of the
syntax and dynamics of argumentative discourse and more illustrative examples (see Kocurek and Pavese
2020).
16 I have to thank a referee for this example.
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If so, the observation that conventionally making a premise-conclusion argument768
involves the use of argument connectives by itself is not in contradiction with the fact769
that sometimes making an argument is possible without argument connectives. Yet, one770
might ask, how can arguments without argument connectives be presuppositional—as771
the current analysis suggests—if argument connectives are the presupposition triggers?772
The answer is that when no argument connective is present, something else—e.g.,773
discourse prosody (intonation and stress) or an implicit argument connective whose774
presence is signaled by prosody—triggers the relevant presupposition. This response775
is independently motivated. It is generally true that discourse relations do not need to776
be expressed by explicit discourse connectors. Consider:777
Discourse John pushed Mark. Mark fell.778
Discourse expresses that a relation holds between Mark’s being pushed by John and779
Mark’s falling—a relation that discourse coherentists call ‘explanation’ (e.g., cf. Asher780
1993; Asher et al. 2003). That this explanation relation holds can also be conveyed781
through an explicit discourse connector, such as ‘because of that’. But as Discourse782
shows, the relevant discourse connector does not need to be explicitly present. Dis-783
course coherent theorists typically analyze discourses without discourse connectives784
on the model of those with discourse connectives—also as expressing the holding of a785
discourse relation but through discourse prosody and/or through ‘implicit’ discourse786
connectors (cf. Bras et al. 2001, 2009).787
Now, arguments are just one type of discourses and argument connectives are just788
one type of discourse connectives. So we should expect something similar to be true789
of them. This motivates thinking that, just like arguments with argument connectives,790
the logical form of connective-less arguments also involves a presupposition—though791
in these cases the presupposition is triggered by discourse prosody or by an implicit792
presupposition trigger.793
According to this suggestion, when in Exercise, students individuate the structure794
of an argument in a discourse that lacks explicit argument connectives, they succeed795
at individuating what marks the premises from the conclusion by locating the implicit796
presupposition trigger in the logical (and non-superficial) form of the argument.797
Zero-premises arguments In logic and in mathematics, it is customary to allow for798
zero-premises arguments, such as:799
ψ ∧ ¬ψ
800
But our current theory of arguments does not encompass zero-premise arguments,801
for it is modeled along the study of argument connectives, such as ‘therefore’, which802
require an antecedent.803
The required fix is, however, once again revealed by looking closely at our argu-804
mentative practice. In natural languages, we can express the force of zero-premise805
arguments by assertions such as:17806
17 I am grateful to Harold Hodes for discussion on this point.
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(BYLOGIC) By logic, either it is raining or it is not raining.807
In (BYLOGIC), the locution ‘by logic’ bears a close structural similarity with the808
locution ‘by modus ponens’ discussed in the previous section. Plausibly, in this case809
too, the locution triggers a presupposition—this time about the validity of a set of810
logical rules (such as those of classical logic). By using the locution ‘by logic’, we are811
signaling that we are taking for granted—and asking our interlocutor to grant—that a812
certain set of logical rules is valid (e.g., those of classical logic).813
If so, then this theory of arguments can be generalized to cover zero-premise argu-814
ments too: the latter can be understood on the model of (BYLOGIC)—as premise-less815
assertions prefaced by (explicit or implicit) locutions such as ‘by logic’, ‘by this logi-816
cal system’, or ‘by this set of rules’, which are made by taking for granted the validity817
of a set of logical rules.818
5 The structural paradox819
5.1 The response820
Our analysis affords a direct response to the Structural Paradox: according to it, giv-821
ing an argument by modus ponens is possible by presupposing that certain entailment822
relations hold. This analysis unpacks the common diagnosis by telling us that giving823
an argument by modus ponens differs from asserting the corresponding conditional824
precisely in that when we argue by modus ponens, we presuppose—but not explic-825
itly state—that the consequent of the conditional follows from the antecedent and we826
presuppose that by presupposing—but not explicitly stating—the validity of the rule.827
This response to the Structural Paradox explains why Achilles cannot reach his828
conclusion. Arguing from premises to conclusion would require presupposing that829
premises entail the conclusion but this is called into question—in this sense his pre-830
supposition fails—and so no argument from pr mise to conclusion is possible (given831
the relevant reading of ‘possible’ in the context). Conversely, suppose it were com-832
mon ground between Tortoise and Achilles that modus ponens holds. Common ground833
licenses conclusions: if the common ground supports a conclusion, then people shar-834
ing the same common ground will be disposed to accept it. Hence, if Tortoise had835
taken for granted what Achilles was taking for granted, she too would come to accept836
the conclusion that Achilles wants to draw (Fig. 1).837





(i) (Q follows from P1, . . . Pn) (= Pn 1)
(ii) (Q follows from P1, . . . Pn 1) (= Pn 2)













5.2 A regress of presuppositions?838
By recognizing the presuppositional structure of arguments, we might overcome the839
regress of the premises. But a natural worry arises: could not a different sort of840
regress—i.e., a regress of presuppositions—arise?841
In order to see why a regress of presuppositions is not possible, recall that pre-842
suppositions differ from premises in that they are backgrounded. What does it mean843
that presuppositions are backgrounded? Recall the linguistic tests that we have used844
to spot presuppositions. Those tests take it that for some content to be backgrounded,845
(1) it cannot be directly challenged (not-at-issuedness) and (2) its projective behavior846
shows that it resists embedding under logical operators (projective behavior).847
Now, the current proposal is that an application of ‘therefore’ will presuppose that848
the premises P1, . . . , Pn supports the conclusion C (Pn+1). It will not additionally849
presuppose that P1, . . . , Pn , Pn+1 support the conclusion, for Pn+1 is not available850
as a premise for that application of ‘therefore’; nor is Pn+1 available for a further851
application of ‘therefore’, unless Pn+1 gets turned into an explicit premise. For as852
backgrounded, that proposition eludes scoping under logical operators and resists853
from being picked up by demonstratives and referential devices. Thus, its being back-854
grounded accounts for why this proposition is ‘impermeable’ to a further application of855
‘therefore’—the successive applications of which would otherwise trigger the regress.856
So, no regress can start (neither the regress of the premises nor the regress of857
the presuppositions), if presupposition stays backgrounded. It will start if one keeps858
challenging it but only because challenging it “un-backgrounds” it—i.e., it turns it859
into a new premise.860
5.3 Whence the infinite regress?861
The current response has the virtue of explaining two further aspects of Carroll (1895)’s862
original fable. One puzzling aspect of the exchange between Achilles and Tortoise is863
that although Tortoise is, in some sense, behaving unreasonably, somehow she is in a864
position to trigger the regress. What is it about Achilles’ argument that enables Tortoise865
to trigger an infinite regress?866
On this analysis, the regress can arise because at each turn Tortoise demands that867
Achilles’ presupposition be made explicit. By doing so, the presupposition becomes at868
issue and as such it is turned into a new premise. But as a new premise is added, arguing869
to the conclusion from the new set of premises requires a new presupposition. Tortoise870
demands that it too be made explicit and in this way turns it into a premise. Adding871
that premise alters the structure of the argument and triggers a new presupposition.872
And so on.873
A little more formally, consider an argument such as ARGUMENT 1 and suppose874
one makes the presupposition that Q follows from if P1, . . . , Pn explicit in the form875
of a premise. The presupposition can be made explicit in one of two ways—either in876
the form of a conditional ‘if P1, . . . , Pn then Q’ or in the form of a metasemantic877
claim ‘Q follows from P1, . . . , Pn’. In both cases, the presupposition becomes a new878
premise Pn+1 (Fig. 2) and that will have the effect of altering the structure of ARGU-879
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ARGUMENT 1 ARGUMENT 2 ARGUMENT 3
P1 P1 P1
. . . . . . . . .
Pn Pn Pn
(Q follows from P1 . . .Pn) Pn 1 Pn 1
(Q follows from P1 . . . Pn 1) Pn 2
(Q follows from P1 . . . Pn 2)
Fig. 2 The dynamic of the regress
MENT 1. A new piece of reasoning—ARGUMENT 2—comes about, one with a new880
presuppositional structure. Now suppose that one makes explicit the presupposition881
that Q follows from P1, . . . , Pn , Pn+1 in ARGUMENT 2, so that it becomes a new882
premise Pn+2 A new piece of reasoning—ARGUMENT 3—comes about. And so on883
(Fig. 2).18884
5.4 The unreasonability of tortoise885
Hence, the current proposal provides an explanatory account of how the infinite886
regress is triggered—by being licensed by the presuppositional structure of argu-887
ments, together with Tortoise’s demand that the presuppositions be made explicit at888
each turn. A second explanandum is that, as many philosophers have observed, this889
demand of Tortoise’s is plainly unreasonable (Wisdom 1974; Stroud 1979; Thompson890
1980; Smiley 1995; Brandom 1994; Boghossian 2000; Broome 2013; Besson 2012;891
Engel et al. 2016). A diagnosis of the regress should explain what is unreasonable892
about this behavior.893
Start by noticing that it is generally unreasonable to challenge or to request that894
something presupposed be made explicit, if it is common ground among all the par-895
ticipants of the conversation. For example, if it is commonly known that Mario has a896
sister, it would be irrational to reply to (23-a) with any of (23-b) and (23-c) (cf. (von897
Fintel, 2008, 2)):898
(23) a. My sister is arriving today.899
b. You mean; if you have a sister, she is arriving today!900
c. Wait a moment, do you have a sister?901
18 According to Dynamic of the Regress (Fig. 2), if one makes the presupposition that Q follows from
P1, . . ., Pn explicit in the form of a premise, so that it becomes a new premise Pn+1, that will have the
effect of altering the structure of ARGUMENT 1. A new piece of reasoning—ARGUMENT 2—comes
about, one with a new presuppositional structure. One might object: why think that ARGUMENT 2 must
itself have its own non-stated presupposition? The reason for this is that ‘therefore’ comes with a deictic
(or anaphoric) element (cf. Brasoveanu (2007, p. 296); Neta (2013, pp. 2009–2406)). Discourse deixis
here is understood along the lines of Levinson (2004). If ‘therefore’ is a discourse deictic expression, then
‘therefore’ contains a deictic element whose reference changes in different linguistic contexts. So ‘therefore’
will pick up different sets of premises depending on the different linguistic contexts. By making explicit the
presupposition in ARGUMENT 1, a new context is created and so new premises are fueled as antecedents
for a novel application of ‘therefore’ in ARGUMENT 2. Because new premises are fueled, a new context
is created and a new presupposition is triggered, different from Pn+1. Similarly, for ARGUMENT 3, and
so on.
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Now, in the exchange between Achilles and Tortoise, the very challenging of Achilles’902
presupposition by Tortoise and her demand that it be made explicit show that Achilles’903
presupposition was not part of the shared common ground between the Tortoise and904
Achilles. Hence, the unreasonability of her demand cannot be due to the fact that what905
is being challenged already belongs to the common ground.906
However, something in the vicinity is plausible: speakers are entitled to expect that907
certain propositions that are particularly platitudinous be part of the common ground.908
For example, facts about the shared language of the participants to the conversation909
are plausibly among these platitudinous propositions—e.g., the proposition that the910
speaker is speaking, saying the words that one is saying are usually accessible to every-911
body present (cf. Stalnaker (1978, p. 323)). Plausibly among these propositions there912
are also propositions to the effect that certain entailment relations between sentences913
hold given the meaning of connectives and that certain patterns of entailment are valid.914
If so, they are among the propositions that speakers are entitled to expect to be, and to915
remain, part of the common ground. Challenging it and/or demanding that it be made916
explicit goes against this expectation. That is what makes it unreasonable.19917
6 Rule-following and revenge918
6.1 Rule-following as a presupposition919
The presuppositional structure of arguments affords a response to the Structural920
Paradox that has the virtue of also explaining at what conditions the infinite regress921
is triggered and why Tortoise is being unreasonable. How does this response differ922
from and (if at all) improve on the standard rule-following account?923
The current proposal differs from the many renditions of the rule-following account924
in both substance and precision. Proponents of the rule-following account often say925
that the modus ponens rule is ‘implicit’ in the practice of giving an argument by926
modus ponens (Brandom 1994; Broome 2000, 2006; Boghossian 2000), but they say927
little about what being implicit in a practice amounts to. On the present account,928
propositions, not rules, are implicit in arguments, for what is presupposed is a929
proposition—i.e., the proposition that the conclusion follows and that the rule is valid.930
The view also gives a precise statement of what it means for a rule to be ‘implicit’931
in an argument: it is for the argument to presuppose that the rule and an instance of932
the rule hold—in a broadly Stalnakerian sense of presuppositions, one that we have933
independent reasons to think plays a central role in our linguistic practice.934
This said, the proposal retains the key insights of the rule-following account. The935
idea that arguing by a rule is a matter of following a rule (Claim 2) is retained: on936
the current proposal, following a rule in the course of an argument is a matter of937
presupposing that the rule is valid. Also, the proposal affords an intuitive account of938
19 There are instances of arguments of modus ponens whose validity is not platitudinous—e.g., McGee
(1985)’s counterexamples to modus ponens. Note that the current diagnosis predicts that, in those cases,
challenging the arguments in question is reasonable, precisely because in those cases it is not platitudinous
that the conclusion follows from the premises, and hence, in those cases, speakers are not entitled to expect
it to be part of the common ground that the conclusion follows from the premises.
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Claim 1—that in a logical system, rules are to be distinguished from principles. The939
former are the logical relations that the logical system is allowed to presuppose that they940
hold; the latter are those logical relations instead that the system can express explicitly941
(in the object language, through explicit premises and object language connectives, or,942
in the metalanguage, through metasemantic clauses). Different logical systems differ943
in what they presuppose. A classical logical system differs from an intuitionistic logical944
system in that it takes it for granted that any sentence follows from its double negation;945
and it differs from a paraconsistent logical system in that it takes it for granted that946
anything follows from a contradiction.947
6.2 Presuppositions and revenge948
How does the current proposal overcome the revenge regress that threatens intentional949
construals of rule-following? As we have seen in Sect. 2, the revenge regress arises950
because on the intentional construal, following a rule requires being guided by the951
rule and, on the Application Model of guidance, applying a rule to a particular case952
requires making an inference of sort. In the case of argument by modus ponens, the953
Application Model would require that one appreciate that the rule of modus ponens954
is valid, that one check whether the premises P and If P then Q fall under the rule, and955
that one then conclude that the rule licenses concluding to Q in the particular case.956
However, the current picture motivates thinking of being guided by the rule in a957
different, deflated sense, which does not fit the Application Model. As we have seen,958
presuppositions cannot be premises—in the technical sense of ‘premises’ introduced959
here—for they elude the scope of logical operators and so cannot be embedded by them960
or picked up by referential devices as premises can. Hence, plausibly presuppositions961
do not guide us in the same way premises do. Because the Application Model would962
involve turning presuppositions into premises, it cannot be the right model of how963
presuppositions guide us, if they do guide us at all.964
I submit that presuppositions can guide us. This is true both of shared presup-965
positions and of private presuppositions. For xample, common grounds guide the966
participants to a conversation to accepting certain assertions and to rejecting others967
(cf. Stalnaker 2002). Even private presuppositions might guide us, as when they dis-968
pose us to accept certain conclusions which we would not be disposed to accept had969
we not have made those presuppositions. But the way presuppositions guide us in970
accepting, e.g, P , is not by fueling us premises for inferences that have P—or accept-971
ing P—as a conclusion. For example, it is not as if participants to a conversation will972
accept Mary’s assertion that John is in London upon realizing that the common ground973
supports the proposition that John is in London and thereby inferring that John is in974
London or that they ought to accept that John is in London. Rather, their sharing the975
common ground directly disposes them to accepting that proposition without having976
to undertaking a further inference.977
So presuppositions do guide us but not in the way premises do—by directly (non-978
inferentially) disposing us rather than by fueling us premises for further inferences.979
In epistemology, this distinction between difference kinds of guidances (or bases) is980
independently motivated. Consider the way perception guides our belief-formation.981
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My perceptually seeing a dog outside disposes me to forming a belief that there is,982
without necessarily constituting a premise in an argument for that belief. If so, it is an983
implicit, rather than an explicit, basis. To capture the way perceptual evidence can base984
our beliefs, Williamson (1997, p. 729) similarly distinguishes between explicit bases985
and implicit bases.20 An explicit basis is a premise belief from which we infer another986
belief. Implicit bases, instead, do not need to be premises. Like perceptual states, they987
guide one directly, not by fueling premises for further inferences. Presuppositions are988
implicit, rather than explicit, bases. In this sense, when, given certain premises that989
have the form P and if P then Q, the presupposition that the rule of modus ponens is990
valid guides one by directly disposing one to accepting the conclusion of the form Q,991
without further inference, just like a common ground directly disposes participants to992
a conversation to jointly accepting a certain assertion, without further inference.993
6.3 Presuppositions and contextual salience994
While the Application Model assumes that knowledge of validities can guide us—and995
hence can be applied to a particular case—only through further inference, according996
to the present response to the revenge regress, knowledge of validities can guide us997
directly as presuppositions do. These two different ways in which a a rule can guide998
us—as a premise or as a presupposition—can also be illustrated with the logical dis-999
tinction between universal instantiation and substitution (cf. Besson (2019), Section1000
2.1). On the Application Model, we can come to see that a logical principle applies1001
in a particular case by going through an argument by universal instantiation from the1002
logical principle taken as a general premise (to the effect, say, that for every P and Q,1003
if P and if P then Q, then Q follows) to the conclusion that the relevant instance of1004
that general principle holds. This application requires an argument and so generates1005
the revenge regress. But being a premise of an argument by universal instantiation1006
is not the only way in which a logical principle can guide us in a particular case.1007
Another way for, e.g., modus ponens to guide us is for it to license certain substitution1008
instances—e.g., to license the substitution instances of the form Q from premises of1009
the form P and if P then Q. As Besson (2019) puts it, logicians tend not to think of1010
substitution as an inferential step. Rather, they think of it as a non-inferential transition1011
governed by meta-principles of that logical system. By performing substitution (rather1012
than universally instantiating), we manifest the ability to recognize directly (i.e., non-1013
inferentially) certain patterns of arguments as contextually salient and in this way to1014
recognize directly certain instances of those patterns as valid.1015
So, our knowledge of validities can guide us as an implicit basis/presupposition1016
rather than as an explicit basis/premise and this difference in modes of guidance is1017
illustrated by the logical distinction between universal instantiation and substitution1018
and by the corresponding competences. On this proposal, rule-following dispositions1019
involve a non-inferential competence of recognizing certain patterns of arguments as1020
contextually salient and so of coming to directly (i.e., non-inferentially) see certain1021
20 According to Williamson (1997), ‘explicit evidence bases’ are not just beliefs but evidential/knowledge
states. This aspect of Williamson’s distinction is not relevant here.
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Premise Presupposition
Linguistic distinction Scope in/d-challengeable Scope out/not d-challengeable
Epistemic distinction Explicit basis Implicit basis
Logical distinction Universal Instantiation Substitution
Psychological distinction Inferential competence non-inferential competence
Fig. 3 Premises versus presuppositions
instances as valid and these rule-following dispositions are explained at least in part1022
in terms of knowledge of validities.1023
Figure 3 summarizes the different (linguistic, epistemic, logical, psychological)1024
dimensions along which presuppositions differ from premises: in their not being1025
directly challengeable and scoping out of connectives, in their being implicit rather1026
than explicit bases, in licensing substitution rather than having to be applied through1027
universal instantiation, and in grounding a direct and non-inferential competence.1028
Why think that knowledge of validities can at least in part explain these rule-1029
following dispositions? Compare knowledge of validities to other cases where1030
knowledge about a domain seems to at least partly ground a similar sort of non-1031
inferential cognitive competence. Consider how a chess player’s knowledge of1032
chess—including their knowledge of the rules and of the possible configurations on1033
the chessboard—can guide them in directly seeing what possibilities are afforded by1034
the current chessboard: in virtue of their knowledge, a chess player can simply call to1035
mind the possibilities afforded by a configuration of pieces on the chessboard, with-1036
out needing to derive them inferentially from the rules of chess or from their mental1037
catalog of possible configurations. To be sure, knowledge of chess is not sufficient1038
for recognizing the possibilities afforded by a configuration of pieces on the board—1039
one in addition needs practice and experience in developing the relevant recognitional1040
abilities (as well as all-purpose abilities such as perceptual and attentional abilities).1041
Nonetheless, their knowledge about chess at least partly explains such an ability.211042
Similarly, the knowledge of validities (in a language) that we gain by virtue of being1043
competent speakers (of that language) by itself might not be sufficient to entirely1044
ground a non-inferential competence of recognizing certain patterns of arguments as1045
contextually salient. So, one might presuppose that a certain rule is valid but not having1046
exercised it enough, one might not have developed the ability to directly recognize a1047
particular argument as instantiating the relevant pattern. In this case, one might fail1048
to accept an argument by modus ponens, despite presupposing the validity of the1049
rule. Like virtually for any skillful performance, training, experience, and all-purpose1050
abilities (like the ability to recognize alike patterns) are needed in addition to knowl-1051
edge. But this is compatible with the relevant cognitive competence, and the relevant1052
21 (Cf. Valaris 2017 pp. 2017–2018) who discusses a semantic model, inspired by Johnson-Laird (1983)’s
mental model approach, on which understanding an argument involves creating a model for the premises
with respect to which the conclusion is assessed. On this semantic model, competent speakers of English
come to directly see that the conclusion follows, upon understanding the premises and the meaning of the
conclusion, without having to undertake an inference that has as its premise that the relevant rule is valid. In
the main text, I remain neutral on the details of the psychological mechanisms underlying our understanding
and acceptance of arguments.
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rule-following dispositions, being nonetheless at least partly grounded on the relevant1053
knowledge.1054
6.4 Presuppositions versus mere dispositions1055
The presuppositional account of rule-following differs from the merely dispositional1056
construal in that it takes one’s rule-following dispositions to be at least partly grounded1057
on an attitude of the rule-follower—i.e., on their presupposing that the relevant rule is1058
valid. As we have seen (Sect. 2.3), some have already pointed out that the explanatori-1059
ness of the merely dispositional account is questionable (Boghossian (2014, p. 14);1060
Fodor 2008). Let me highlight some explanatory advantages of the presuppositional1061
account over the merely dispositional account.1062
Rule-following attributions come with certain normative consequences. So for1063
example, from the fact (a) that one follows the rule of modus ponens and (b) that one1064
follows the classical rules for negation, a further normative claim follows—i.e., (C)1065
one also should follow the rule of modus tollens. On the merely dispositional account,1066
however, it is rather mysterious how normative consequences like (C) come about. For1067
example, from the fact that one is merely disposed to accept modus ponens arguments1068
and from the fact that one is merely disposed to accept arguments by the classical rules1069
of negation—where these dispositions are not themselves grounded on a commitment1070
to the validity of the rules, nor on an attitude that has those rules as its content—it does1071
not thereby follow that one ought to also be disposed to accept arguments by modus1072
tollens. Bare dispositions simply do not elicit this sort of normative commitments. By1073
contrast, attitudes do elicit this sort of normative commitments (whether they are tacit1074
or not): from the fact that e.g., one (tacitly or non-tacitly) has certain beliefs, certain1075
things follow about what else one ought to (tacitly or non-tacitly) believe. On the1076
current proposal, one’s rule-following dispositions are grounded on a (possibly tacit)1077
attitude towards the validity of the relevant rule. And it is clear that if one is committed1078
to modus ponens, by presupposing that it is valid, and is also committed to the classi-1079
cal rules for negation, by presupposing that those rules are valid, one ought to also be1080
committed to the rule of modus tollens—i.e., one would also have to presuppose that1081
the rule of modus tollens is valid.1082
So the presuppositional account of rule-following improves on the merely dis-1083
positional account in that it can account for the distinctive normative commitments1084
elicited from rule-following attributions. To the extent that these normative commit-1085
ments are ones that proponents of the rule-following account would want to explain,1086
the presuppositional account provides a better theory of rule-following that the merely1087
dispositional account.1088
7 Objections1089
By studying the presuppositional structure of arguments, we have found an indepen-1090
dently motivated model of how to think of guidance by a rule in a course of an argument1091
that differs from the Application Model. Because the revenge regress only arose on1092
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Application Model of guidance, the current proposal avoids the revenge regress. In1093
this section, I discuss two objections to the current proposal.1094
The first is that the focus on ‘therefore’ results in my response to the Struc-1095
tural Paradox to be too limited, for ‘therefore’ privileges arguments with categorical1096
premises, whereas the regress can arise also in the context of arguments with suppo-1097
sitional premises. The second is that, if arguments are constitutively presuppositional,1098
then my response has the implausible consequence that every argument is question-1099
begging and uninformative. Let me consider them in turn.1100
7.1 The regress in subarguments1101
As Pavese (2017) has observed, ‘therefore’ is not always allowed in the context of a1102
supposition:221103
(24) a. It is raining. Therefore/so/hence, the streets are wet.1104
b. ??Suppose it is raining; therefore/so/hence the streets are wet.1105
c. ??If it is raining, therefore/so/hence the streets are wet.1106
If ‘therefore’ could only occur in arguments with categorical premises, the present1107
analysis might seem to predict that the regress could only arise in arguments with1108
categorical premises. That would be a bad prediction, because of course the regress1109
can also arise within subarguments.231110
Luckily, the data is more complex and should be assessed with caution. ‘Therefore’1111
can be licensed in the context of a supposition, when the linguistic environment is1112
subjunctive:1113
(25) a. Suppose it were raining. The streets would, therefore, be wet.1114
b. If it were raining, the streets would, therefore, be wet.1115
c. If Mary were English, she would, therefore, be brave.1116
d. Suppose Mark were Englishman. He would, therefore, be brave.1117
Moreover, ‘therefore’ is tolerated with so-called ‘advertising conditionals’—interro-1118
gatives that play a role in discourse similar to that of antecedents of conditionals:1119
(26) Single? (Then) You have not visited Match.com. (Starr (2014, 4))1120
(27) a. Single? Therefore, you have not visited Match.com.1121
b. Still looking for a good pizzeria? Therefore you have not tried Franco’s1122
yet.1123
This suggests that at least under certain conditions, ‘therefore’ can appear in suppo-1124
sitional contexts. This data is congenial to the idea that premises of an argument can1125
22 Under supposition, connectives like ‘then’ are much preferred to ‘therefore’:
(i) a. Suppose it is raining. Then, the streets are wet.
b. If it is raining, then the streets are wet.
23 I am thankful to Tim Williamson for forcefully raising this objection to me.
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be supposed as well as asserted. If so, then pace (Pavese 2017), the current theory of1126
argument modeled along a semantics for ‘therefore’ can predict that, just like categor-1127
ical arguments, subarguments also have a presuppositional structure and, as such, are1128
susceptible to Lewis Carroll’s regress.1129
7.2 Begging the question and accommodation1130
On this current proposal, in virtue of presupposing something more general, every1131
argument with the form of Argument Schema will take for granted that C follows1132
from P1, . . . , Pn :1133
Argument Schema P1, . . ., Pn . Therefore C .1134
But is not the whole point of an argument of this form to establish that something1135
follows from its premises? If so, how can that be a presupposition, rather than the1136
point, of the argument?1137
The crucial idea, which the current semantic analysis motivates, is that the main1138
point of an argument is not that of asserting that something follows from the premises.1139
That is exactly what Grice’s not-at-issue tests, Pavese’s projection tests, as well as the1140
other tests considered in Sect. 3 establish. Rather, an argument of that form aims at1141
reaching the conclusion, upon asserting or supposing its premises, and it accomplishes1142
that by taking certain things for granted.1143
Does not this proposal make arguments of this form question-begging, though?1144
On the technical definition of a question-begging argument, an argument is question-1145
begging only if it presupposes the truth of its conclusion (Hoffman 1971; Sanford1146
1972). So, technically, the proposal does not render all arguments question-begging,1147
because according to it, making an argument from P1, . . ., Pn to C does not require1148
presupposing that C is true; rather, it only requires presupposing that C follows from1149
P1, . . . , Pn .241150
Now, it is true that the current proposal does predict that certain arguments are1151
circular. For example, in Argument B, the proposition that Q follows from P and if P1152
then Q is indeed presupposed by its subargument:1153
Argument B1154
P, if P then Qi1155
Thereforei , Q1156
Therefore j , if P and if P then Q, Q follows.1157
But intuitively, Argument B is circular. Hence, this is the correct prediction.1158
A related worry is that, if every argument presupposes that its premises entail the1159
conclusion, then no argument can be really informative, for there is a sense in which its1160
conclusion will be already ‘contained’ in the premises. In response, start by noticing1161
that the current proposal delivers that in many cases making a complex argument can1162
be informative. For example, consider Argument C:1163
24 It is worth noting that this important distinction between presupposing that C is true and presupposing
that C follows from P1, . . . , Pn cannot be easily modeled on the standard coarse-grained model of common
ground. But this limitation is limitation of that model of common ground and should not be taken to indicate
that the distinction is not there.
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Argument C John is in Londoni . Thereforei , he is in the UK. Thereforei , he is1164
in Europe. Thereforei , he is not in Asia.1165
Argument C concludes to John’s not being in Asia from he is being in London, and1166
at no point in the argument was the proposition that his not being in Asia follows from1167
John’s being in London presupposed by the argument. In this sort of case, the proposal1168
correctly predicts that new knowledge can be acquired by means of an argument.1169
Secondly, even simple arguments can be informative, for presuppositions can some-1170
times be informative—i.e., they can result in a restriction of the context set, through the1171
phenomenon of accommodation (Lewis (1979, p. 340); von Fintel 2008). For exam-1172
ple, suppose it is not known in the context that Pittsburgh is in Pennsylvania. The1173
presupposition triggered by Argument D is most likely to be accommodated in this1174
context and this accommodation will result in restricting the context set—by ruling1175
out possibilities where Pittsburgh is located in a state other than Pennsylvania:1176
Argument D John is in Pittsburgh. Therefore, he is in Pennsylvania.1177
Finally, does not the current proposal predict that there is no possibility of1178
knowledge-extension for one-step arguments? For example, one might worry that1179
Argument E cannot be knowledge extending, if it presupposes that the conclusion1180
follows from its premises:1181
Argument E P, if P then Q, Therefore, Q.1182
However, as discussions of the problem of deduction teach us, an argument can be unin-1183
formative and yet be knowledge-extending. The problem of deduction is the problem1184
of how any logically valid argument can ever be knowledge-extending ( Mill 1846),1185
given that its conclusion is contained in the premises and in the structure of the argu-1186
ment. According to a prominent response, an argument can generate new knowledge,1187
despite being uninformative, because reaching a conclusion from certain premises1188
might extend our knowledge by making us form an epistemically supported belief in1189
the conclusion which we did not previously have (cf. Rumfitt 2008).1190
In conclusion: while the current proposal correctly predicts that arguments like1191
Argument B are circular, it does not predict that arguments in general are. Moreover,1192
it is compatible with arguments being informative and knowledge-extending—such1193
as Argument C or those, like Argument D, that require accommodation. Finally,1194
one-step arguments such as Argument E can be uninformative and yet knowledge-1195
extending, in accordance with a popular solution to the problem of deduction.1196
8 Conclusions1197
According to the response to the Structural Paradox developed in this essay, Lewis1198
Carroll’s paradox teaches us something foundational about the nature of arguments.1199
What it teaches us is that the task of making everything explicit in arguments is1200
doomed to be endless, for as argument-givers, we constitutively take things for granted:1201
arguments are possible only against a non-empty set of presuppositions.1202
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The idea that arguments are constitutively presuppositional is not at all novel. Just to1203
name two famous examples, Wittgenstein (1969) argues that testing is constitutionally1204
presuppositional and so are inferences that are involved in scientific practice. Wright1205
(2004b) (cf. also Wright 2004a) argues for the presuppositional nature of arguments1206
starting from considerations having to do with Moore’s paradox and skepticism. The1207
novelty of the argument developed in this essay relies on how this conclusion is1208
reached—as a response to the Structural Paradox that is independently motivated1209
by a study of how we argue.1210
In Sect. 2, we discussed the common diagnosis, endorsed by Russell and others.1211
As we have seen, Russell thought that Lewis Carroll’s regress motivated a distinction1212
between two types of relations: the relation of an antecedent to consequent (and is1213
expressed by ‘if then’) and the relation that holds between premises and conclusions1214
in an argument—the latter relation being metalogical because it cannot be expressed1215
in formal systems without regress. The current proposal vindicates this thought under-1216
lying Russell’s endorsement of the common diagnosis. For the current proposal also1217
takes the regress to show that the relation between premises and conclusion in an argu-1218
ment cannot be required to be explicitly expressed to hold in first-order arguments, on1219
pain of regress. However, on this proposal, this relation is metalogical, in the sense that1220
it can be explicitly expressed to hold in the metatheory when one gives the soundness1221
and completeness proofs.1222
According to the response to the Structural Paradox developed here, giving an1223
argument by a rule is possible by following that rule; and following a rule in the1224
course of an argument is a matter of presupposing that certain entailment relations hold.1225
Because it grounds rule-following dispositions in attitudes of the rule-follower towards1226
the validity of the relevant rules, the presuppositional account of rule-following is better1227
suited than the merely dispositional accounts to explaining the distinctive normative1228
commitments that are elicited by rule-following. Finally, the presuppositional view of1229
rule-following overcomes the revenge regress that afflicts other intentional construals1230
of rule-following by motivating a way of thinking of guidance by a rule alternative to1231
the Application Model.1232
This proposal echoes some remarks by Broome (2013, pp. 230–234) who talks as1233
if when arguing, e.g., from it is raining and from if it is raining, the street will be wet,1234
to the conclusion that the streets are wet, we background a ‘linking’ belief about the1235
conclusion following from the premises.25 While Broome thinks that the presence of1236
a linking backgrounded belief is plausible, he worries that the relevant background1237
belief will not be part of an argument, because, on pain of Carroll’s regress, linking1238
beliefs cannot be extra premises. The picture developed in this essay speaks to this1239
concern. The semantics and pragmatics of arguments independently motivates taking1240
the structure of arguments to be presuppositional. Hence, this picture motivates and1241
explains how something backgrounded can be part of an argument without being a1242
premise—i.e., by being a presupposition of the argument.1243
According to this proposal (see Sect. 4), that a certain rule is valid in one’s language1244
is among the semantic conventions that one presupposes when speaking that language.1245
This claim does not thereby commit one to inferentialism about the meaning of logical1246
25 See also Besson (2012).
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connectives (e.g., Peacocke 1987; Boghossian 1996; Brandom 1994; Tennant 2002).1247
Indeed, the current view does not take a stance on whether the meaning of logical1248
connectives is fully determined by their rules (as inferentialism has it)26 or, rather, the1249
converse is true—i.e., certain rules are valid in virtue of the meaning of the relevant1250
logical connectives. Although the view is also compatible with conventionalism about1251
logic—the view that logical truths and logical validities are fully explained by linguistic1252
conventions (e.g., Warren (2020), p. 10)—it does not entail it. For one might endorse1253
the view advanced here while at the same time take the validity of logical rules to1254
be only partly a matter of linguistic convention—and partly to depend on other facts,1255
such as how our mind works or how reality is fundamentally structured.1256
This essay has not tried to discuss the Cognitive Paradox. However, this response1257
to the Structural Paradox promises to cast light on the Cognitive Paradox too.1258
Cognitive scientists routinely explain cognitive systems’ behavior in terms of their1259
presupposing certain things—e.g., that the visual system presupposes that the light1260
comes from above or that there is only one light source Ramachandran (Ramachandran1261
(1988), p. 76), Scholl (2005). Moreover, we do ordinarily assign a role to presupposi-1262
tions in reasoning, when we explain one’s reaching a certain conclusion by appealing1263
to the fact that they were taking certain truths for granted. The success of these explana-1264
tory practices suggests that presuppositions might play a cent al role not just in our1265
linguistic practice but also in our cognitive lives.1266
Although I stayed away from embracing any cognitive proposal, my account is moti-1267
vated by a study of the semantics and pragmatics of arguments. Methodologically, this1268
endeavor is similar to that of modeling rational communication—communication for1269
beings that share many features of our rationality but not necessarily our psychology—1270
starting from a semantics for natural languages (e.g., Lewis 1969, 1979; Stalnaker1271
1987; Soames 2008). The thought is that just like the general structure of rational1272
communication can be extracted from a study of our ordinary linguistic practice, in a1273
similar way, the general structure of rational arguments can be extracted from a study1274
of our ordinary argumentative practice. This sort of approach is particularly conge-1275
nial when it comes to addressing the Structural Paradox, for this paradox does arise1276
from the consideration that, despite the possibility of the regress, we do routinely give1277
arguments by modus ponens. For this reason, it is not surprising that looking at how1278
we ordinarily argue can provide a fruitful avenue for explaining how that can be.1279
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